Maimonides famously says some rather radical things about God – radical even by philosophical standards – both about what God is like “in Himself” and about God’s relationship with the created universe. Maimonides’ most detailed and sustained presentation of these radical ideas is in his discussion of divine attributes in chapters 50–70 of the Guide. Indeed, it seems evident that Maimonides’ point in that section is to make plain these radical ideas. To put matters rather simply and straightforwardly, the radical ideas are these: Strictly speaking, God shares nothing substantive in common with created beings, neither existence nor life nor power nor knowledge. Indeed, strictly speaking, God has no intrinsic nature at all, no attributes at all, and stands in no relations whatsoever to the created universe – save for negative attributes and attributes of action. Even speaking strictly, God does have negative attributes and does stand in whatever relations to the created universe are ent

This chapter argues that it’s possible for something to be brought into existence by something that is non-actual. Segal distinguishes his argument from arguments for causation by omission, and draws a comparison between his argument and Zeno causation. Finally, he connects the topic to Jewish mystical traditions.

To what extent are the methodological assumptions of contemporary Jewish studies in conflict with the project of this book? Tzvi Novick begins a discussion with the editors in order to bring the contours of this issue sharply into focus.

A handful of analytic philosophers have examined certain legal (halakhic) passages from the Talmud to uncover what appear to be fairly clear views on the metaphysics of material objects, actions, identity, and time. Should we take these appearances at face value? I will argue that the rabbis of the Talmud employed legal variants of concepts that are naturally and automatically employed in ordinary metaphysical theorizing, where the variant is determined in large part by what would make the rabbis’ metaphysical claims true. This latter fact has the consequence that it is very difficult for a Talmudic rabbi to stake out a controversial metaphysical claim, or even a straightforwardly metaphysical claim, period. We philosophers should continue trying to extract metaphysics from halakha, but we shouldn’t presume that what we uncover will involve the metaphysical concepts we’re accustomed to. We should rather be prepared for a halakhic reconceptualization of the world.

A Priori: Theism . WHAT IS THE A PRIORI? WHAT IS THEISM? You know as well as I do—and without needing to trust anyone else on the matter— , and [...]

This chapter attempts to characterize analytic philosophy as an intellectual tradition, and sketches the potential it has to spark a new age in Jewish philosophy. The chapter also outlines the structure and content of the rest of the volume.

The traditional Jewish view of the afterlife has a labyrinthine landscape and a complex chronology, including no less than: reincarnation, purgatory, annihilation, a world of departed souls, the messianic age, the bodily resurrection of the dead, and the world to come. Our paper first addresses some of the skepticism in contemporary Jewish thought about the afterlife. We then outline the central features of the traditional Jewish view, along with some disagreements within the tradition. We then turn to a philosophical puzzle about the significance of the afterlife and close with a related discussion of its purpose.

This chapter formulates a version of idealism and argues for it. Sections 2 and 3 explicate this version of idealism: the world is mental through-and-through. Section 2 spells this out precisely and contrasts it with rival views. Section 3 draws a consequence from this formulation of idealism: idealism is necessarily true if true at all. Sections 4 and 5 make the case for idealism. Section 4 is defensive: it draws from the conclusion of section 3 to reply to a central, perhaps the central, anti-idealist argument. Section 5 is on the offense: it develops a new argument for idealism based on the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. The contemporary debate in philosophy of mind has been dominated by physicalism and dualism, with idealism almost totally neglected. This chapter rectifies this situation.