This chapter begins by outlining four theses that are elaborations of Hume’s claim that the contents of the world ‘are entirely loose and separate’. The first, core thesis is a ‘patchwork’ theory of possibilities. The others concern laws of nature, causal relations, and global supervenience. Any position which accepts the first thesis but denies at least one of the others is referred to as a ‘Half-Hearted Humean’ position. The chapter argues that, contrary to appearances, any Half-Hearted Humean position is inconsistent. The only viable options are Wholehearted Humeanism or a denial of the core Humean thesis.

Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call 'Mereological Monism': that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does not imply any form of Monism at all. I survey the costs associated with taking these escape routes along with the costs associated with accepting Mereological Monism.

Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called 'noseeum inference'. Erik Wielenberg (2010 has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.

Paul Churchland argues that Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism is unsuccessful and so we need not accept its conclusion. In this paper, we respond to Churchland's argument. After we briefly recapitulate Plantinga's argument and state Churchland's argument, we offer three objections to Churchland's argument: (1) its first premise has little to recommend it, (2) its second premise is false, and (3) its conclusion is consistent with, and indeed entails, the conclusion of Plantinga's argument.